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Korea Pledges Billions of Dollars at Inaugural Leaders’ Summit with Africa
The Republic of Korea will commit $14 billion in export financing to support Korean companies investing in Africa while increasing its official development assistance (ODA) to $10 billion by 2030.
The President of Korea, Yoon Suk Yeol announced this on Tuesday in Seoul at the opening of the first Korea-Africa Summit, attended by 25 African heads of state and government, as well as the president of the African Development Bank Group Dr Akinwumi Adesina.
Up to 48 African countries were represented at the summit by either a president, king, prime minister, vice president or minister to discuss, “The Future We Make Together: Shared Growth, Sustainability, and Solidarity.”
Visit our blog often or follow us on X.President Yoon Suk Yeol pledged that Korea would extend its Trade and Investment Promotion Frameworks, and Investment Protection Agreements to African countries.
African leaders praised Korea for its open and mutual approach to strengthening cooperation with the continent. They highlighted investment opportunities in their own countries and across the continent.
In his address, Bank Group President Adesina referred to the theme of the summit and said: “To show solidarity with Africa, for the ‘future we make together’, I wish to request that Korea solidify this Korea-Africa Summit by agreeing to rechannel SDRs (Special Drawing Rights) to the African Development Bank.”
Adesina added: “The approval by the IMF Board for use of SDRs of $20 billion for hybrid capital, as championed by our institutions, with immense advocacy of African heads of state and government, marks a new way to scale up development financing.”
The Bank Group president said, “The IMF-approved $20 billion limit for SDR rechannelling for hybrid capital, channelled through the African Development Bank and other multilateral development banks, will deliver $80 billion of new financial support.”
Additionally, Adesina urged Korea to contribute generously to the forthcoming 17th replenishment of the African Development Fund, the concessional window of the Bank Group, as well as to the Alliance for Green Infrastructure in Africa (AGIA), a new initiative by the Bank, in partnership with the African Union and Africa50, to mobilise private financing for green infrastructure in Africa.
The Korea-Africa Economic Cooperation (KOAFEC) Trust Fund (KTF), established by the Korean Government in 2007, and managed by the Bank, is the largest among the Bank’s 17 active bilateral trust funds, in terms of contributions received, and portfolio size.
Adesina’s call for greater financing commitments from wealthier countries like Korea comes on the heels of the 59th Annual Meetings of the Bank, where discussions focused on a comprehensive reform of the global financial architecture, through innovative financing mechanisms like the rechannelling of SDRs, and a re-evaluation of unfavourable debt management practices.
President Adesina praised Korea’s inspiring and determined development journey, that transformed “a poor and aid-dependent country” into “one of the largest donor countries in the world.”
He highlighted the deep relationship between Korea and the Bank, starting from 1982 when Korea became a member of the Bank. Since then, he said, Korea “has contributed close to $795 million to the Bank, the African Development Fund and the Korea Trust Fund.”
“You are investing in the right institution: the African Development Bank,” he declared.
Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame said Korea’s experience shows a country can be radically transformed in the course of a generation. “Is there any reason Africa hasn’t become a high-income region?” he posed.
United Republic of Tanzania President Dr Samia Suluhu Hassan called for investment in clean cooking agenda as part of the just energy transition. She said investment in clean cooking will lower emissions, deforestation and respiratory diseases that affect especially women and children.
“We are working with Dr Adesina (President of the African Development Bank) to fundraise for this agenda,” she said.
President William Ruto publicly acknowledged the African Development Bank’s financial innovations. He told Korea to consider channelling some of the SDRs through the African Development Bank.
Other touchpoints of the bilateral relationship cited by Adesina include the jointly organized Korea-Africa Economic Cooperation Ministerial Conference (KOAFEC), the Korea-Africa Energy Investment Framework, and the $115.4 million KOAFEC Trust Fund, the Bank’s largest bilateral fund.
Providing an update on the $600 million Korea-Africa Energy Investment Framework, sealed in 2021, Adesina said: “We have jointly approved the first two projects: $57 million for the Kenya Transmission Network Improvement Project and $52 million for Eastern Ethiopia Electricity Grid Reinforcement.”
Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, the President of Mauritania and Chairperson of the African Union, and co-chair of the summit alongside host President Yoon described the summit as an opportunity for both sides to renew their commitment to shared growth and partnership based on mutual respect and trust.
A new chapter
The Chairman of the Africa Union Commission Moussa Faki Mahamat observed that the trade volume between Africa and Korea remains insignificant. “In 2022 Africa accounted for 2% of Korea’s trade,” said Mahamat and called for promotion of bilateral trade relations, more exchanges in the private sector and focusing on key value-added areas.
King Mswati III of Eswatini encouraged Korean business community to invest in any part of the continent. “Choose a location to establish industries. Choose anywhere. We are no longer competing but collaborating.”
That chimed with President Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mbasogo who spoke about his country’s 2050 vision for diversification of the economy and looked “forward to Korean companies investing in attractive Equatorial Guinea. We will provide appropriate guarantees and support for investors.
Togolese leader Faure Gnassingbe spoke about the opportunities his country presents. “Togo is an open economy. We are small in size… We have a major seaport which needs to be expanded to promote trade.”
The President of Cote d’Ivoire Alassane Ouattara said the summit had created “a turning point in the relationship between Korea and Africa.”
Zimbabwe’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa said, “The Journey travelled by Korea is a beacon and source of encouragement to Africa as it works to lift its people out of poverty.”
In his closing remarks, President Yoon of Korea summed up the summit as “a new chapter for Korea-Africa relations.”
He also outlined Korea’s areas of interest for support and partnership in Africa: digitalisation, e-government, education and capacity building, climate change, food security and critical minerals. A Korea-Africa critical minerals dialogue is scheduled to be inaugurated later this year.
On the sidelines of the Summit, Adesina held bilateral meetings with the Korean Minister of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs, Song Miryung.
The African Development Bank signed two agreements: a Memorandum of Understanding between the Bank and Korea Trade Insurance Corporation (K-SURE), and a Letter of Intent between the Bank and Korea Overseas Infrastructure and Urban Development Corporation (KIND).
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South Africa’s election results present 3 options for government: all are fraught with danger
South Africa’s election results present 3 options for government: all are fraught with danger
Philippe Burger, University of the Free StateSouth Africans do not have a deep culture of coalitions. There have been a few coalitions at provincial and municipal levels but most of these were quite unstable.
The outcome of the 2024 national election up-ended 30 years of electoral dominance by the African National Congress. The party garnered only 40.18% of the vote while the Democratic Alliance got 21.81%, the uMkhonto weSizwe Party 14.58% and the Economic Freedom Fighters 9.52%.
That means that the country will need to learn to dance the coalition dance, a dance that under the best of conditions is fraught with partners stepping on each other’s toes.
Visit our blog often or follow us on X.And all of this happens in an economy that is not in good shape. South Africa has an economy with negative per capita growth, high and rising unemployment, poverty and inequality, a government deeply in debt, and 26 million people – 42% of the population – on grants.
One possible outcome from ongoing talks is that the African National Congress partners with the radical Economic Freedom Fighters led by Julius Malema and with former president Jacob Zuma’s uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) Party. After 30 years of promises of a better life for all, millions of people feel excluded, left in poverty, with little means to take care of themselves. Zuma and Malema have shown that they know how to capitalise on this sense of exclusion.
The second option is that the ANC partners with the biggest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance.
Lastly, it could opt to run a minority government.
All three options are fraught with difficulties and dangers.
Disillusionment on the part of former ANC members who joined the Economic Freedom Fighters and uMkhonto weSizwe makes coalition formation with the political left quite difficult. And should it succeed, the economic consequences would likely be quite negative. The Economic Freedom Fighters and the uMkhonto weSizwe Party are not business-friendly parties. A coalition with them would likely result in the alienation of investors, a further drop in economic growth and consequently a lack of job creation.
On the political right, coalition formation between the ANC and the Democratic Alliance would be no less difficult, especially given their significant philosophical differences about the role of government and on how to overcome economic and social challenges. Even if they were to succeed in cobbling together a coalition, it would cause serious instability.
Such instability would not be conducive for investment. Investors would prefer to stand on the sidelines and observe how such coalitions shaped up.
The third option, of running a minority government, presents another set of challenges – in particular the prospect of a very unstable government in a permanent state of gridlock. (Examples of minority governments can be found in Canada and a number of European countries.)
The possible partners
A coalition between the ANC and the Economic Freedom Fighters or uMkhonto weSizwe is not as straightforward as it might look.
Founded a decade ago, the Economic Freedom Fighters has represented alienated, excluded youth, who feel the deal struck in 1994 doesn’t benefit them.
Malema was brilliant in mobilising large numbers of young people. Although his vote in this election waned somewhat, he still, broadly speaking, represents a cohort of younger people disillusioned with ANC policy. And these voters will not necessarily like a coalition with the very same ANC unless it brings them a demonstrable benefit. Anything less will cost the Economic Freedom Fighters support in future elections.
In the case of Zuma, it is a little more complex. To understand his influence, we need to understand the man and the role he played in KwaZulu-Natal over almost 40 years. In the early 1990s, before the first democratic elections, he played a key role in pacifying the bloody conflict between the Inkatha Freedom Party and the ANC. And, from very humble, rural beginnings, via the anti-apartheid struggle and prison, he made it to deputy president of both the party and the country. And then President Thabo Mbeki axed him as deputy president of the country following his implication in a corruption scandal.
But Zuma fought back. And once back, this time as president of the party and the country, he mobilised KwaZulu-Natal in support of the ANC. He remains hugely popular in the province, as the recent election results show. The uMkhonto weSizwe Party garnered 45.9% of the vote.
His lifetime achievement was inspirational to many, because, if a man from such humble beginnings could become president, then anything was possible for everyone.
As in the case of the Economic Freedom Fighters, it would not be so easy for the ANC to go into a coalition with uMkhonto weSizwe. They represent groups of people seriously aggrieved by the ANC. They are angry and disgruntled. If the ANC wants a coalition with these parties, it will have to offer them something that addresses their anger and disgruntlement.
But doing that would probably result in rising government expenditure and debt levels. And if that coalition had to raise taxes to deliver on all the promises it made, investors would be likely to run away.
Given the leftist, statist views of both the Economic Freedom Fighters and uMkhonto weSizwe, we might also see more interventionism, regulations and unwise political support to state-owned entities.
South Africans have recently seen the private sector assisting the government in resolving the electricity, transport and harbour infrastructure bottlenecks. That would probably all come to nothing with this type of coalition.
Financial markets would probably not look favourably on a coalition with populists.
A coalition between the ANC and the Economic Freedom Fighters or uMkhonto weSizwe would likely be an economic disaster. Either the ANC delivers on all the promises such a coalition will entail, which will be fiscally unaffordable and economically counterproductive, or if they try to contain the fiscal cost, and therefore not deliver on their promises, the coalition will fall apart and introduce further instability.
However, there are some clear heads in the ANC who would not like to go down this path.
The Democratic Alliance
A coalition with the Democratic Alliance could take two forms. One is a real coalition with the ANC and the Democratic Alliance, and possibly other smaller parties like the Inkatha Freedom Party, sharing cabinet positions.
However, for a party like the Democratic Alliance this would hold the serious danger that if things were to go badly over the next five years, it would be seen as complicit and lose votes in the next election.
Should the Democratic Alliance nevertheless enter such a coalition, government’s economic policy would pivot slightly more pro-market and possibly include a greater focus on frugality and efficiency in government.
But it would be difficult and time consuming to carry out these sorts of measures with a reluctant senior partner. The resulting frustration on the part of the Democratic Alliance would then likely cause the end of the coalition.
Such a coalition would be inherently unstable because the parties are philosophically quite far apart. Foreign policy in just one example.
The second form of coalition between the ANC and Democratic Alliance entails the ANC running the executive branch of government and the Democratic Alliance running parliament – the so-called “supply and confidence” model. Thus, the ANC leader would be president and appoint the cabinet with ANC appointees, and the Democratic Alliance might appoint the speaker or deputy speaker, and chairs of parliamentary committees. It would presumably also include an agreement that the Democratic Alliance would support the budget and not introduce a no-confidence vote in the ANC-aligned president.
The ANC would have to negotiate support for each piece of legislation it brought to parliament. This would result in very little being passed.
Without an agreement to support the budget and confidence in the president, the ANC would have little incentive to support such a coalition and might prefer to form a minority government.
Going it alone
A minority government would be very unstable as getting anything through parliament would be almost impossible.
If the annual budget isn’t passed, spending becomes unauthorised – a messy situation politically and economically.
None of the options on hand would be easy. South Africans need to hang on to their seats. It’s going to be a rocky five years.
This is an edited version of a talk delivered at a webinar hosted by the University of Free State Centre for Gender and African Studies and Institute of Race Relations on 5 June 2024. The opinions expressed in this op-ed represent those of the author and not necessarily those of the institution.
Philippe Burger, Dean: Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences, and Professor of Economics, University of the Free State
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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Ghana is ‘best place to visit in 2024’
Ghana has become Africa’s capital for foodies, thanks to its daily markets and pop-up restaurants.
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41 African countries set for stronger growth in 2024
East Africa is fastest growing region, West Africa to pick up, and Southern Africa to record slight increase in growth; Report proposes bold reforms of the global financial architecture, stronger African voice in MDBs.
African economies remain resilient, despite challenges that are testing economies worldwide. According to the latest African Development Bank Group’s African Economic Outlook (https://apo-opa.co/3KrFNjn), 41 countries on the continent are projected to experience stronger growth rates in 2024 than they did in 2023.
The report unveiled at the Bank’s Annual Meetings on Thursday in Nairobi, described Africa’s growth potential as ‘remarkable’. The continent will retain its 2023 ranking as the second fastest-growing region after developing Asia in 2024 and 2025. The theme of the 2024 AEO, “Driving Africa’s Transformation: The Reform of the Global Financial Architecture,” aligns with the Bank’s Annual Meetings’ theme.
Visit our blog often or follow us on X.African Development Bank President Dr Akinwumi Adesina said while the Bank was proud of the growth projections of many African countries as reflected in the report, it was not blind to the challenges. “Africa’s future is bright, but need to make sure we tackle governance, transparency, accountability, and management of our natural capital. We need to make sure resources are used for the benefit of the people of this continent… The kind of resilience we are talking about cannot happen unless we deal with the issue of climate change.”
He added: “We must make sure we are investing in our young people—in their skills, talents, entrepreneurship, and giving them tools. That is why I am excited about what we are doing with the Youth Entrepreneurship Investment Banks.”
The report warns that Africa is off track to meet almost all of the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030.
It argues that unless corrective action is taken, including to reverse the steepening poverty curve, Africa will be home to almost 9 out of 10 (or 87%) of the world’s extreme poor by 2030.
According to the African Economic Outlook, the rebound in Africa’s average growth includes a rise to 3.7% in 2024 and 4.3% in 2025, exceeding the projected global average of 3.2%. Of this figure, 17 African economies are projected to grow by more than 5 percent in 2024. The number could rise to 24 in 2025, as the pace of growth accelerates.
This growth trajectory is expected to surpass pre-2023 levels, with East Africa leading as the fastest-growing region (up to 3.4 percentage points). Other regions are also projected to witness moderate to robust growth.
In a presentation, Chief Economist and Vice President of the African Development Bank, Prof Kevin Chika Urama, underscored why strategic policies and firm political commitment are key to the effective use of resource wealth for domestic revenue generation.
He also described hard infrastructure, including roads, railways, and bridges, and soft infrastructure, including knowledge and institutional governance capacity, as “two wings of an aircraft”.
“Investing in productive infrastructure is key to accelerating Africa’s structural transformation,” he said.
Growth performance and outlook by region:
Growth prospects vary across Africa’s regions, reflecting differences in economic structure, commodity dependence, and policies.
East Africa, the continent’s fastest-growing region, will see real GDP growth rising from an estimated 1.5% in 2023 to 4.9% in 2024 and 5.7% in 2025. The downward revision of 0.2 percentage point for 2024 compared with the forecast in the January 2024 Africa’s Macroeconomic Performance and Outlook (MEO) (https://apo-opa.co/4bY0sqN) is due to larger-than-expected contractions in Sudan and South Sudan following the ongoing conflict in the former.
Africa’s future is bright, but need to make sure we tackle governance, transparency, accountability, and management of our natural capital
Growth in Central Africa is forecast to moderate from 4.3% in 2023 to 4.1% in 2024 before improving strongly to 4.7% in 2025. The upgraded forecast is due to expectations of stronger growth in Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo as a result of favourable metal prices.
Growth is projected to pick up in West Africa, rising from an estimated 3.6% in 2023 to 4.2% in 2024 and consolidating at 4.4% the following year. This is an upgrade of 0.3 percentage point for 2024 over the January MEO 2024 projections, reflecting stronger growth in the region’s large economies—Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal.
In North Africa, growth is projected to decline from an estimated 4.1% in 2023 to 3.6% in 2024 and 4.2% in 2025, with a downward revision of 0.3 percentage point for 2024 from the January 2024 MEO. Except for Libya and Mauritania, growth has been revised downward for all other countries in the region.
Growth in Southern Africa is projected to pick up slightly from an estimated 1.6% in 2023 to 2.2% in 2024 and firm up to 2.7% in 2025. The growth rates for 2024 and 2025 show an upgrade of 0.1 percentage point over the January 2024 projections, mainly reflecting a 0.7 percentage point increase in South Africa’s projected growth. Due to South Africa’s larger weight in the region, the upgraded growth forecast offset the combined effect of downward revisions in Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
African Economic Outlook makes bold proposals to reform the global financial architecture
The African Economic Outlook 2024 calls for an overhaul of the global financial architecture to transform African economies. This includes giving Africa a greater voice in multilateral development banks and international financial institutions, reflecting its growing share of global gross domestic product and rich natural resources.
Adesina said, “Let’s be clear. By seeking to transform the global financial architecture, Africa is just asking for a fair share of access and availability of resources to build on our vast economic opportunities.”
The report highlights the glaring inadequacies of the current global financial system in closing Africa’s financing gap for structural transformation, estimated at US$402.2 billion annually between now and 2030. To rectify these disparities, the report proposes a bold agenda for reforming the global financial architecture, including in the five following key areas:
Leveraging Private Sector Financing: The African Economic Outlook advocates for greater private sector participation to complement public investments, particularly in areas with high social returns such as climate action and human capital development.
Simplifying the Global Climate Finance Architecture: The report calls for streamlining the global climate finance architecture to enhance coordination and facilitate access for African countries, which are disproportionately affected by climate change.
Reforming Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs): The AEO urges MDBs to revise their business models to provide long-term concessional financing at scale, to developing countries, bolstering their capital positions, channeling a portion of IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to MDBs and ensuring a healthy replenishment of the concessional windows of the African Development Bank and the World Bank—the African Development Fund and the International Development Association.
Streamlining Debt Resolution Mechanisms: Recognizing the slow and cumbersome nature of existing debt resolution mechanisms, the African Economic Outlook advocates for reforms to expedite debt workouts and ensure sustainable debt management, including innovative market-based solutions like “Brady bonds,” debt relief for climate purposes, and sovereign debt authority systems.
Enhancing Domestic Resource Mobilization: The report emphasizes the importance of strengthening domestic revenue mobilization through improved tax policies, enhancing efficiency in government revenue collection and utilization, combatting illicit financial flows and tax avoidance, and leveraging Africa’s abundant natural resources.
According to the report, “Domestic resource mobilization is good, but so is the prudent use of such resources. Countries should therefore strengthen capacity to improve public finance management”
Every year, the African Economic Outlook report provides timely evidence and analysis crucial for African policymakers, empowering them to make informed decisions.
- 2024 African Economic Outlook (https://apo-opa.co/3V6UQny)
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Price Hike makes South Africans To Dump DSTV – TV/Movies
The pricing of its DStv satellite pay-TV package increased by between 3.1% and 7.8%. DStv’s streaming-only packages remained unchanged.
MultiChoice may try to increase the money it makes from its subscribers through these price increases, but this strategy has been failing.
Despite price increases last year, mass-market ARPU declined by 3%, mid-market by 2%, and premium by 4%.
Visit our blog often or follow us on X.This means many DStv subscribers are dumping the more expensive packages or downgrading to cheaper options.
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South Africa heads for coalition government
Uncertain times for South Africa’s foreign policy as country heads for coalition government
Bhaso Ndzendze, University of JohannesburgAfter South Africa’s 29 May election, the African National Congress has lost the electoral majority it held for 30 years, but remains the party with the highest number of seats in parliament. This makes it a key partner in the formation of a coalition government.
For 30 years the ANC had a comfortable majority which allowed it to shape policy at home and abroad. The outgoing administration’s approach to foreign policy became more assertive recently. It sought to negotiate peace in the Russia-Ukraine War and filed a genocide case at the International Court of Justice against Israel’s invasion of Gaza. Though popular, the move against Israel may have split South Africans, some of whom are more concerned about the economy, while others support Israel.
With 40% of the national parliamentary seats, the ANC will have to negotiate its policy positions with its coalition partner, or partners. The three leading contenders to partner the ANC are the Democratic Alliance, the uMkhonto weSizwe Party and the Economic Freedom Fighters. The parties lie second, third and fourth in terms of parliamentary seats.
Visit our blog often or follow us on X.As a political scientist who has researched the nexus between South Africa’s electoral politics and its engagement with the changing global order, I expect South Africa’s foreign policy to be one of the bargaining points as the ANC engages various potential coalition partners.
This is significant because over the past three decades, the international community has come to know where South Africa stands on major geopolitical questions. In particular, the country has been a key player in the realignment of global power, partly through its membership of the Brics grouping – Brazil, Russia India, China and South Africa. As of 1 January 2024, five new members (Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) had joined Brics.
South Africa has also sought to be a voice for Africa and the broader global south. This is especially since the COVID-19 pandemic, when it spoke out against what it termed vaccine apartheid.
Based on electoral performance, the likeliest coalition partners for the ANC are, respectively, the Democratic Alliance (DA), with 21.7% of the vote, the uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MKP) with 14.66% and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) with 9.47%.
I have gauged how they might seek to influence the direction of foreign policy by looking at their party manifestos and leader statements. From this analysis the ANC seems faced with three broad choices: a Democratic Alliance that is pro-west, an Economic Freedom Fighters party that is more revisionist than the ANC itself, and an uMkhonto weSizwe Party that largely reflects the ANC’s own foreign policy posture but vehemently opposes the ANC’s current leader and has contributed to the ANC’s fall below 50%.
Democratic Alliance
The two issues that are most likely to be a sticking point for the Democratic Alliance are the ANC government’s attitude towards Israel and its relationship with Russia.
In its election manifesto, the Democratic Alliance lists seven priorities. All are domestic issues. Nevertheless, statements by its leaders and parliamentarians point to a party that is decidedly pro-Ukraine and anti-Russia. It’s moderate on Israel and sceptical of the Brics grouping.
Following the 2023 Brics summit in South Africa in August 2023, Emma Louise Powell, the Democratic Party’s shadow foreign minister, criticised the grouping, calling it an “increasingly unholy alliance”, and the summit a waste of money.
The party’s leader John Steenhuisen also visited Ukraine and expressed solidarity with Kiev.
On the Israel/Palestine issue the party removed an MP from its shadow cabinet for expressing a pro-Palestine stance. And Democratic Alliance leader John Steenhuisen refuses to call Israel’s conduct of its war on Gaza an act of genocide, saying:
One man’s genocide is another man’s freedom.
uMkhonto weSizwe Party and Economic Freedom Fighters
In its manifesto, the Economic Freedom Fighters party champions greater continental integration. This includes free movement of people.
Further afield, it not only supports Palestinians but also advocates giving weapons to Hamas, according to its leader, Julius Malema.
The uMkhonto weSizwe Party’s manifesto is more moderated. It envisions a government that would
ensure South Africa’s foreign policy reflects its national interests and values, advocating for fairness and mutual respect in international relations.
The manifesto expresses solidarity with Russia, Cuba and Palestine
in their struggles against western imperialist forces.
The party also calls for a review of international accords and agreements, including South Africa’s membership of the International Criminal Court – ostensibly to reinstate South Africa’s sovereignty.
It also calls on South Africa to
work with the Brics countries to explore alternative currencies and international settlement mechanisms.
This alignment of the ANC should come as no surprise. Much of the ANC’s current foreign policy (including the entry into Brics) was crafted under Jacob Zuma as president (2009-2018). In its appraisal of the Cyril Ramaphosa government’s foreign policy, however, the party is scathing.
Its manifesto states that
The current government seems intent on destroying our tradeable sector and reducing our country to total external dependence on the west.
This may also explain why some of its leading figures have declared they would not form a coalition with the ANC under the leadership of Zuma’s nemesis, Ramaphosa. The statement still leaves the door open for a coalition with the ANC should it decide to recall Ramaphosa.
The country, therefore, would see more foreign policy continuity under an ANC-uMkhonto weSizwe Party coalition, while there would be major stability-threatening disagreements within an ANC-Democratic Alliance or ANC-Economic Freedom Front government.
This is especially important considering that foreign policy is no longer made by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation alone. Virtually every government department has a foreign affairs desk.
This decentralisation of foreign policy also means that there might be considerable disagreement even if the ANC were to manage to keep the department for itself.
The Demoractic Alliance and the ANC have disagreed before when the alliance’s Solly Msimanga, then a newly elected mayor of the city of Tshwane, visited Taiwan in December 2016. The ANC, which recognises China’s claim of sovereignty over the island, expressed its discontent with the visit and its Tshwane caucus called it treason“.
In a national coalition government, such moves would bring instability.
Domestic and foreign policies
Domestic policy is also important for foreign engagement. The election outcome is not only about South Africa’s relationship towards the world, but also the outside world’s perception of the country.
The ANC government has in recent years struggled to attract foreign direct investment (declining by R54.5 billion or about US$2.9 billion in 2023, according to the Reserve Bank), in part due to corruption, power outages, and a perceived lack of competitiveness born of its post-1994 racial equity and labour laws.
The ANC’s choice of coalition partner will have an impact on this. If it gets into bed with the Democratic Alliance, it will be signalling a pro-market stance. If, however, it joins up with the smaller parties, it will likely result in a renewed emphasis on policies that drive greater equity in the country.
Bhaso Ndzendze, Associate Professor (International Relations), University of Johannesburg
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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Malawi faces a food crisis
Malawi faces a food crisis: why plans to avert hunger aren’t realistic and what can be done
Joachim De Weerdt, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and Jan Duchoslav, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)Malawi is heading towards a severe food crisis later this year. Drought brought on by the El Niño weather pattern has affected the harvest of maize, the staple food grown by nine out of 10 farming households in the country.
The government declared a state of disaster in March as the country entered its dry season with very low food stocks. Malawi consumes around 3.5 million tonnes of maize every year, but only 2.9 million tonnes will be harvested according to government estimates – a shortfall of 600,000 tonnes.
On 30 April President Lazarus Chakwera said the country needed US$447 million in aid to import food, boost dry season production, and future-proof Malawi against the next drought. The government is unlikely to be able to raise the entire amount.
Visit our blog often or follow us on X.We, and our collaborators listed below, analyse food systems and agricultural policies in Malawi. We believe that the only way to ensure that Malawians have enough food to eat this year is to import it.
Building a food system that can withstand future droughts is the most important objective, but one that cannot be achieved in time to prevent hunger this year. This leaves the country with two options: importing food, or growing food during the ongoing dry season. In this article, we argue that imports are the only realistic way to ensure that Malawians have enough food to eat before the next main harvest.
The next rains are only expected towards the end of 2024, for a harvest around April 2025. This means that, as in past El Niño affected years, up to 40% of the population are likely to need food assistance.
For a cash-strapped country which imports more than it exports, growing food in the dry winter season is a more attractive proposition than using scarce foreign exchange to buy it. The government believes that if it enables farmers to grow crops this winter, they will be able to produce enough maize to make up for this year’s lost harvest. This is a very risky strategy. It relies on three assumptions, none of which are realistic.
It is too late for winter cropping
First, growing crops in winter without irrigation can only happen if the soil has retained enough residual moisture from the rainy season. The Malawi government says that, if it buys US$45.2 million worth of maize seed and chemical fertiliser for smallholder farmers who have access to land in shallow wetlands (dambos) and on riverbanks, these farmers will be able to grow 210,000 tonnes of maize this winter – over one third of the total amount needed.
But this is not possible after a drought. Even in a year where enough rain falls in the wet summer season, maize that relies on residual moisture cultivation must be planted before June. This year the soils are too dry across most of Malawi. Only the less thirsty crops such as sweet potatoes are still being grown with residual moisture. But this is standard practice in Malawi, so there is little room for expanding their cultivation.
Second, the appeal assumes that massive amounts of maize will be grown under irrigation. The government plans to supply US$25.5 million in seeds and fertiliser to middle scale farmers and institutions like the Malawi Defence Force and Greenbelt Authority Mega Farms to grow 218,000 tonnes of maize (just over one third of the maize needed) using existing irrigation schemes. The government also wants to contract big commercial farms to grow 100,000 tonnes of maize for purchase by the National Food Reserve Agency at a cost of US$48.5 million.
This would come at a large opportunity cost, because the irrigation equipment that is in working order is already being used to grow other crops (often for export).
Third, the government has said that it will repair almost 5,800 hectares of dilapidated irrigation schemes and newly irrigate 12,800 hectares of land. It will spend US$31.3 million doing this, and says this could produce enough maize to make up about 15% of the shortfall.
This is the type of investment that, if done right, would increase agricultural production capacity for years to come. But repairing irrigation equipment takes months and constructing new irrigation schemes takes years. It will not help prevent hunger this year and cannot be an emergency response.
Food imports are necessary
This leaves only one viable means to ensure that Malawians do not go hungry this year: food imports. We have argued before that food should be imported as soon as it becomes clear that Malawi will not be able to harvest enough crops.
This should be done before food prices start rising (as they typically do after each main harvest) and before the country faces stiff competition on regional markets from Zambia and Zimbabwe, which also have a maize shortage this year.
Donor support is crucial
Unfortunately, the government does not have the resources to import the grain that will be needed, so donors will have to step in if hunger is to be averted. But they might be hesitant to foot the bill because they worry that a short-term humanitarian response could negatively affect long-term investment in food system resilience by competing for limited resources and diminishing the urgency of seeking a lasting solution.
However, this is not the right time for a conversation about how Malawi can better face future disasters or whether aid stymies the reforms needed to improve the country’s resilience. Failing to import food would have dire consequences.
In a normal year, hunger costs Malawi over 10% of GDP in lost productivity, poor health, and missed school days. Without humanitarian aid, the losses will be worse this year. Impoverished people whose resilience has already been deeply eroded will pay for survival by depleted assets (having to sell off the few that they have to buy food), deteriorated health, and compromised education, reversing years of economic development. Children in particular are likely to suffer life-long losses in cognitive and physical ability when exposed to hunger.
This should not be allowed. We ought to first face the looming crisis, learn from it, and then make the necessary reforms and long-term investments – not the other way around.
Mazvita Chiduwa (associate scientist in the Sustainable Agrifood Systems Research Team at CIMMYT, Lilongwe), Simon Denhere (WFP deputy country director for Malawi), George Phiri (FAO assistant county representative in Malawi) and Rodwell Mzonde (previously director of Agricultural Planning Services at the Malawi Ministry of Agriculture until his retirement in March 2024) contributed to the analysis this article summarises.
Joachim De Weerdt, Senior Research Fellow & Malawi Country Program Leader, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and Jan Duchoslav, Research Fellow, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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Zuma’s MK Party steals the ANC’s thunder with provocative rhetoric
South Africa elections: Zuma’s MK Party steals the ANC’s thunder with provocative rhetoric and few clear policies
Mashupye Herbert Maserumule, Tshwane University of TechnologyFormer South African president Jacob Zuma surprised many by leading a new party to rival the ruling African National Congress (ANC), a party he used to lead, in the pivotal 29 May 2024 general election. The upstart uMkhonto we Sizwe Party (MK Party) caused a major upset for the ruling ANC, especially in Zuma’s heartland, KwaZulu-Natal province, where it unseated the ANC. Political scientist Mashupye H. Maserumule shares his insights on the MK Party.
How did the uMkhonto we Sizwe Party fare?
The MK Party garnered almost 15% of the national vote. This contributed significantly towards reducing the ANC’s majority to 40.2%. For the first time since it came to power in 1994, the ANC got less than 50% of votes in the national polls. The MK Party also displaced the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) from its position as the third-largest political party. It’s now trailing with 9.44%.
In KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), the MK Party leads with 45.32% of the provincial vote, making it a major party in Zuma’s home province. With only 17% of the provincial vote, the ANC has been consigned to the third spot. This is despite dispatching its bigwigs to the province, such as former president Thabo Mbeki, to counter the MK Party. The ANC lost KZN to the MK Party in a big way.
Visit our blog often or follow us on X.In Mpumalanga, the ANC survived by a whisker. It got 51.0% of the provincial vote, while the MK Party became the second-largest party with 17.1%. It nearly pushed the ANC below 50% as in KZN. These two provinces (KZN and Mpumalanga) have emerged as the MK Party’s strongest support bases.
For a party that was only five months old when it participated in the 2024 national and provincial elections, its performance is no small feat. It performed better than the polls had predicted.
What does it stand for?
Despite being the new kid on the block, the party describes itself as being
“rooted in a rich history of striving for justice and equality”. Its declared vision is to
transform South Africa into a beacon of equality, prosperity and sustainability.
There are a number of problems with this. Firstly, it’s what almost all parties promise. And the MK Party doesn’t have a coherent policy on how to realise this vision, let alone a clear ideological position to distinguish itself from other political parties.
Secondly, the party has adopted incendiary rhetoric, tinged with populist extremism. For example, it talks about doing away with the supremacy of the country’s constitution and replacing it with “unfettered” parliamentary sovereignty.
This is troubling because South Africa has been on a path of establishing a constitutional democracy based on a set of essential rights for its citizens since its first democratic elections in 1994. It’s also undesirable because parliament ruled supreme under apartheid, passing unjust laws that oppressed the majority black population.
The party also promises to incorporate traditional leadership in the country’s parliamentary system. This is not necessarily to be frowned upon, but it has the potential to upend the country’s constitutional democracy. For, in this system of managing public affairs, the rule of law lies with the constitution.
University of Johannesburg political scientist Siphamandla Zondi sees the MK Party as
just another faction of the ANC that has decided to operate from outside the ANC.
Political commentator Eugene Brink says it’s “Zuma’s get-out-of-jail card”.
I agree.
Zuma’s almost two-decades-old corruption charges related to the 1999 arms deal – to acquire and upgrade the post-apartheid military’s equipment – are still hovering over his head and he continues to be in and out of court. He is hoping to win a two-thirds majority to change the constitution, and give himself the power to override the court process. He pits the rule of law and the supremacy of the constitution against traditional leadership.
What lies behind the MK Party’s formation?
The MK Party was launched on 16 December 2023 in Soweto. It was at this event that Zuma announced his association with it. He has since emerged as its leader and has been campaigning vigorously for it as its public face.
The MK Party’s formation is linked to Zuma’s longstanding grievance against the ANC. That came to a head following his arrest and incarceration on 7 July 2021 for refusing to appear before the State Capture Commission. He had defied the order of the Constitutional Court to do so and was sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment.
Why are the party’s name and logo controversial?
The name uMkhonto weSizwe, MK in short, historically belongs to the ANC’s military wing. It means “the spear of the nation”.
In the early 1960s, ANC leader Nelson Mandela and Joe Slovo, the head of South Africa’s Communist Party, were tasked by the ANC to form the MK.
More than six decades later Zuma’s MK Party argues that the ANC cannot claim exclusivity to the MK name as its creation. For its part, the ANC has claimed that MK is inextricably linked to the ANC.
The ANC tried to stop the MK party from using the name uMkhonto weSizwe and trademark or anything similar to it. It argued that the use of the logo constituted a breach of the country’s Trade Marks Act. But the High Court dismissed the ANC’s application with costs. The ANC was mulling appealing the case at the time of writing.
What are the MK Party’s prospects?
Despite its impressive electoral debut, at least insofar as the 2024 national and provincial elections are concerned, the MK Party’s prospects of political longevity look bleak. This is because of its leader himself, Jacob Zuma (82), its biggest existential threat.
The party is personalised around him. It may not have any political future without him given that it is relying heavily on the euphoria Zuma engenders by using Zulu ethno-nationalism and populist rhetoric.
The young party is already racked by factionalism, power struggles and leadership purges.
The article was updated to reflect the election outcome.
Mashupye Herbert Maserumule, Professor of Public Affairs, Tshwane University of Technology
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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